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Eikenberry: Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation - Justifying Restrictions on

LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION-Justifying
Restrictions on Lawyers' Speech. Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).

Ten years after the United States Supreme Court first held that
attorneys have a constitutional right to advertise,' the Florida Bar Association (Bar), in 1987, began a two-year study of lawyer advertising and
solicitation. 2 After conducting hearings and commissioning a public opinion survey,3 the Bar petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to change the
state's advertising rules.'

During this same two-year period, the United States Supreme Court
held in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n that a state's categorical prohibition of attorneys' direct-mail solicitation of potential clients violates the
First Amendment.' Nonetheless, the Bar proposed a categorical ban on
targeted direct-mail solicitation of potential personal injury or wrongful
death clients.6 A number of parties filed objections to the proposed rules,
maintaining that such a ban was not in accordance with Shapero.7
Notwithstanding precedent, the Florida Supreme Court decided that
it could institute a thirty-day ban instead of a total ban on targeted directmail solicitation.' In February 1991, the Florida Supreme Court adopted
the new rules.' An attorney's letters offering his legal services to accident
victims or their survivors within thirty days of the accident now were
forbidden.

1. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). See
infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
2. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner].
3. Id. A copy of the summary, which was before the Florida Supreme Court at the time it
adopted the new rules, was introduced in the trial court. Id.
4. The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990) [hereinafter Petition to Amend].
5. 486 U.S. 466, 471 (1988).
6. Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d at 454.
7. Id. at 456. Interested parties included the Citizens Against Censorship and a number of
individuals, including John T. Blakely who was later added as a plaintiff-appellee.
8. Id. at 459. The enactment of advertising and solicitation rules follows a pattern: the United
States Supreme Court makes a decision; states amend their rules, not giving up more of the restrictions on advertising than necessary; then the Court makes another decision, invalidating the restrictions and the rules are amended again. Ann B. Stevens, Wyoning Rules of Professional Conduct: A
ComparativeAnalysis, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 463, 513-17 (1988) (citing Walter P. Armstrong,
Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1070-71 (1978)).
9. PETITION TO AMEND, 571 So. 2d at 452.
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In March 1992, G. Stewart McHenry, a Florida attorney, and his
wholly owned lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc. (WFI), filed
suit"0 in federal district court" challenging Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) 2 and 47.8(a) 3 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. McHenry 4 alleged
that he regularly sent targeted solicitations to accident victims or their
survivors within thirty days after accidents and that he wished to continue doing so in the future.15 WFI said it wanted to conduct business
via direct-mail advertising, contacting accident victims or their survivors within thirty days of accidents and referring potential clients to
Florida lawyers.' 6 WFI alleged that a thirty-day ban was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech. 17 The Bar maintained that a
thirty-day ban serves substantial state interests justifying the restriction
on speech.' 8
The district court referred the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment to a magistrate judge. The magistrate concluded that the state
had substantial interests in protecting the privacy and tranquility of recent
accident victims and preventing undue influence or overreaching by attor10. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992), aft'd, McHenry v. Florida
Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (1lth Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
2371 (1995).
11. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
12. Rule 4-7.4(b)(1), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, provides in pertinent part:
a written communicaA lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent....
tion to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if: (a) the
written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is
addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred more than
30 days prior to the mailing of the communication.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2374 (1995). The rule applies indirectly to lawyer
referral services through the Bar's prohibition on lawyers accepting referrals from services that
contact potential clients in a manner that would violate the rles if the contact was made by a lawyer.
Id.
13. Rule 4-7.8(a), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, provides:
A lawyer shall not accept referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the service: (1)
engages in no communication with the public and in no direct contact with prospective
clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if the communication or contact were made by the lawyer.
Id.
14. In October 1992, McHenry was disbarred for reasons unrelated to this suit. See Florida
Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992). Another Florida lawyer, John T. Blakely, was added
as a plaintiff-appellee during the pendency of the appellate proceedings. Brief for Respondents at ii n.
3, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2374 (1995) [hereinafter Brief of Respondent]. WF1
continued as a plaintiff because it alleged injury in fact from the indirect application of the thirty-day
ban to it through Rule 4-7.8(a). Id. at 2.
15. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
16. Id.
17. Brief of Respondent, supra note 14, at 5.
18. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 2, at 17.
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neys and recommended that the district court grant the Bar's motion for
summary judgment. ,9
The district court, however, rejected the magistrate judge's report
and recommendations. 2' The court concluded that the restrictions "substantially impair. and impede the availability of truthful and relevant information which can make a positive contribution to consumers in need of
such legal services."" Relying on Bates v. State Bar of Arizona' and
subsequent cases,2' the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of WFI, holding that the rules violated constitutional protections of free
speech.24 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on similar grounds.25
In Florida Bar v. Went For It., Inc., the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court held
that state rules which prohibit lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail
solicitations to victims and their relatives for thirty days following an
accident or disaster do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution.26
This casenote examines the scope of First Amendment protection
for lawyer advertising and solicitation. This note traces the history and
development of the principles that govern commercial speech, particularly as applied to attorneys. In addition, the note suggests that the
Court did not apply the commercial speech test as rigorously to invalidate restrictions on lawyer solicitation as it has to restrictions on other
forms of commercial speech. Furthermore, this casenote suggests that
the Court effectively overruled Shapero. Then, the note predicts how
far state regulation of lawyer advertising may be allowed to go. Finally, this casenote evaluates the impact of the decision on the rules of
professional conduct in Wyoming.
BACKGROUND

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

shall

make

no

law .

abridging

the freedom

of

Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2374.
McHenry, 808 F. Supp. at 1548.
Id.
433 U.S. 350 (1977). See infra
notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
See McHenry, 808 F. Supp. 1543.
Id. at 1546.
McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1043-44.
Florida Bar, 115 S.Ct. at 2374.
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speech .... "27 The United States Supreme Court has held the First
Amendment applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 Although freedom of speech has been recognized as the "touchstone of individual liberty," 29 the Court has held that
freedom of speech is not absolute. 0
A. Commercial Speech and Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation
Until the mid-1970s, First Amendment freedom of speech protection
was not afforded speech categorized as "commercial" in nature3' (i.e.,
speech that advertises a product or service for profit or for business purpose)." Consequently, commercial speech was substantially regulated.33
Since 1976, however, commercial speech has received a measure of
constitutional protection.34
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court struck down as violative
of the First Amendment a state statute that prohibited pharmacists from
advertising prescription drug prices.35 Although the Court limited the
protection to commercial advertising by pharmacists, one year later, in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court invalidated a state statute that
prohibited advertising by lawyers,36 placing lawyer advertising in the
category of constitutionally protected commercial speech.37 In Bates, the
Court held that the state may not suppress truthful newspaper advertising

27.
28.
147, 160
29.
1991)

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
(1939).
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsITUTIONAL LAW § 16.2, at 934 (4th ed.

30. Id. § 16.7, at 943.
31. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-15, at 891-892 (2d ed.

1988).
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (6th ed. 1990).

33. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 16.27, at 1011. The Supreme Court has upheld
such regulation saying that although the First Amendment does guard against abridgment of the freedom of speech, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (refusing to enjoin enforcement of ordinance against distribution of commercial advertising matter in the streets, as applied to
distribution of a leaflet urging visitors to attend exhibition of a former Navy submarine for a fee).
34. TRIBE, supra note 31, § 12-15, at 892.
35. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). The Supreme Court rejected the argument that speech which does "no more than propose
a commercial transaction, is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas' and from 'truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,' that it lacks all protection." Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
36, 433 US. 350 (1977).

37. Id.
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of routine legal services." The Court reasoned that the free flow of commercial information serves substantial individual and societal interests in
assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking and that commercial
speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. 39
Direct in-person solicitation of clients by attorneys or their agents
presented questions the Bates Court expressly reserved and the Court
addressed one year later in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n. The
Ohralik Court held that the First Amendment does not preclude the state
from disciplining an attorney for in-person solicitation in circumstances
where the state has a right to prevent harm to the public."
In Ohralik, the appellant, an Ohio attorney, solicited a contingent fee
arrangement from two eighteen-year old auto accident victims, one in a
.hospital room where she lay in traction and the other on the day she arrived
home from the hospital.4' The Court found that, under the circumstances, 3
the two potential clients were incapable of making informed judgments to
protect their interests.' The facts of that case, the Court said, demonstrated
the potential for overreaching and undue influence inherent in person-toperson solicitation and the state's need to avert harm to the public by prohibiting solicitation in circumstances where such harm is likely to occur. 5
B. The CentralHudson Standardfor Reviewing Restrictions on Attorney
Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court has granted limited protection to commercial
speech "commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values."' Restrictions on commercial speech are analyzed under
a three-part test synthesized from modern commercial speech cases47 and
set
4

forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n. 8

38. Id. at 384.
39. Id. at 364 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-765 (1976)).
40. 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978).
41. Id.
42. Id.at 449-50.
43. The record indicates the appellant used information he obtained from one woman to induce
the other to orally assent to representation, secretly tape recorded her assent, and tempted both women with what appeared to be a cost-free offer. Id. at 449-451.
44. Id. at 467.
45. Id. at 468.
46. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 16.31, at 1034. See Board of Trustees of State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 456 (1978)).
47. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 16.31. at 1035.
48. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The
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A court adhering to the Central Hudson standard must first determine whether the speech in question concerns a lawful commercial
activity and is truthful and non-misleading.49 States may freely regulate
misleading commercial speech or commercial speech that concerns
unlawful activity. Commercial speech which falls into neither of those
two categories may be regulated, if the state satisfies a three-prong
test: first, the state must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
its regulation; second, the state must demonstrate that the regulation
directly and materially advances that interest; and third, the regulation
must be 'narrowly drawn.'5

A government regulation which restricts commercial speech will be
held unconstitutional if the interest sought to be protected is not substantial enough to justify a restriction on speech."' A restriction on commercial speech will be invalidated if the means used do not directly advance
the asserted government interest or unnecessarily burden communication
of the message. 52
In 1985, the Zauderer53 Court struck down an Ohio rule54 that prohibited attorneys from soliciting business through printed advertisements
containing truthful, non-deceptive information about a specific legal problem.55 In Zauderer, the Court, applied the Central Hudson56 test to lawyer
solicitation.57
Distinguishing written advertisements from the in-person solicitation
at issue in Ohralik, the Zauderer Court held that dangers of overreaching,

Central Hudson Court struck down a ban on advertising promoting the use of electricity. Id. at 571.
The state's asserted interest was supporting the country's policy of energy conservation. Id. at 568.
Applying the four-part test, the Court said: promotional advertising is lawful commercial speech; the
state's interest in conservation is substantial; the ban on advertising advances this interest; but the
state's total suppression of speech was too extensive. Id. at 566-571.
49. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 16.31, at 1034-35.
50. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-565 (1980)).
51. Id.
52. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 16.31, at 1035.
53. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
54. The complaint alleged that the appellant had violated the state's rule prohibiting a lawyer
from accepting employment after giving unsolicited advice to a layman to obtain counsel or take legal
action. Id. at 632-33.
55. Id. at 646-647. The appellant, an Ohio attorney, ran a newspaper advertisement indicating
his willingness to represent women injured by the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device. Id. at 630. The
information and advice in the advertisement was not found to be false, fraudulent, misleading, or
deceptive. Id. at 634. The appellant initiated 106 lawsuits on behalf of women who responded to his
advertisement. Id. at 631.
56. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
57. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638.
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invasion of privacy, undue influence, and outright fraud inherent in person-to-person solicitation are not present in written advertising." In addition, the Court said in-person solicitation presents "unique regulatory
difficulties because it is 'not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny.' ' 59 The Court concluded that the substantial interests justifying the
ban on in-person solicitation upheld in Ohralik cannot justify a ban on
truthful, non-deceptive written advertising regarding the legal rights of
potential clients.'

In 1988, the Court granted First Amendment protection to targeted
direct-mail in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association." Shapero, a Kentucky attorney had sought approval for a letter to potential clients facing
foreclosure. The Kentucky ethics rule in question was identical to Rule
7.3 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Rule 7.362 categorically prohibited truthful, non-misleading,

targeted, direct-mail solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain and had
been adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court.63 In Shapero the United
States Supreme Court invalidated blanket prohibitions against truthful,
non-deceptive letters sent by attorneys to potential clients known to face
particular legal problems,' holding that a blanket prohibition is violative
of the First Amendment. 65
The Shapero Court reasoned that the recipient of targeted, direct
mail, like the recipient of a newspaper advertisement or mass mailing,
can readily put the unwanted letter in a drawer to be considered later or
in a waste basket.' Advertising through mass mailing is constitutionally
protected, the Court said, and the state's prohibition of targeted mailing,

58. Id. at 641-642. "It is apparent that the concerns that moved the Court in Ohralik are not
present here. Although some sensitive souls may have found appellant's advertisement in poor taste, it
can hardly be said to invade the privacy of those who read it. More significantly, appellant's advertisement-and print advertising generally-poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence.
Print advertising may convey information and ideas more or less effectively, but in most cases, it will
lack the coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate." Id.
59. Id. at 641 (quoting Ohralik Gas & Electric Corp. v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
466 (1978)).
60. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642.
61. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
62. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 7.3 (1984). ABA Rule 7.3 was identical
to Wyoming's current Rule 7.3. See infra notes 137-138.
63. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470-471.
64. Id. Justice O'Connor dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice
Stevens joined.
65. Id. at471.
66. Id. at 475-76. The Court observed that it had never distinguished among modes of written
lawyer advertising. Id. at 473.
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which is a more efficient form of advertising than mass mailing, is illogical. An attorney, the Court concluded, would wisely mail a letter only to
those whom it would most interest. 67
Commercial speech now seems to enjoy extensive constitutional
protection. 6' During the 1992-93 term, the Court decided three commercial speech cases: Edenfield v. Fane, U.S. v. Edge Broadcasting Co., and
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. In Edenfield, with only
Justice O'Connor dissenting, the Court struck down a prohibition by the
Florida Board of Accountancy against in-person solicitation of clients.69
The Edge Broadcasting majority considered the government's control of
gambling to be a substantial interest and upheld a federal statute that
prohibits broadcasters in a non-lottery state from advertising another
state's lottery.7' In Discovery Network, a city prohibition against commercial newspaper dispensing boxes failed because the city did not demonstrate a reasonable fit between the restriction and the city's interest in
encouraging safety and aesthetics.7

In the only commercial speech case of 1993-94, Ibanez v. Florida
Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, the
Court held that the Florida Board of Accountancy could not discipline a
certified public accountant, who was also an attorney, for using "CPA"
and "CFP" on advertisements, business cards and law firm stationary.72
During the 1994-95 term, the Supreme Court heard two commercial
speech cases, Rubin, Secretary of Treasury, v. Coors Brewing Co. and the
principal case on lawyer advertising and solicitation, FloridaBar v. Went
For It, Inc. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Rubin Court struck down
government restrictions on beer advertising.73
PRINCIPAL CASE

A sharply divided United States Supreme Court, in Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and
held that a thirty-day ban of lawyers' targeted, direct-mail solicitation of

67. Id. at 473. The Court was distinguishing between a mass mailing opening "[I]s your home
being foreclosed on?" and a targeted mailing opening "['lt has come to my attention that your home
is being foreclosed on." Id.
68. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, § 16.26.
69. 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1993).
70. 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993).
71. 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1514 (1993).
72. 114 S. Ct. 2084, 2086-87 (1994).
73. 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995). See infra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
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accident victims did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer joined.' Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg joined.76

The Court began by reaffirming that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as such, is accorded a "limited" measure of First
Amendment protection.' The facts of the case were then scrutinized
under an "intermediate" standard within the framework of Central
Hudson."

Applying the three-part test, the Court held that the state's asserted
interests in protecting the privacy of personal injury victims79 and in
preserving the dignity of the legal profession were substantial.' States
have a "compelling interest in the practice of professions within their
boundaries," and states have "broad power" to establish standards and
regulate practitioners in the interest of public health and safety.81
Considering the second prong, the Court reiterated that the state
must demonstrate that the harm is real.' The Court held that the record
substantiated that the harm was real. 3 In view of the statistical and anecdotal data provided by the Bar' and not refuted by the respondents, the
Court decided that the public finds direct-mail solicitations immediately
following an accident to be an invasion of privacy reflecting poorly on the
legal profession.' In light of the data prepared by the Bar, the Court
found that the thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitation satisfies the second prong by targeting a concrete, non-speculative harm.'

74. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 2371 (1995).
75. Id.

76. Id.at 2381.
77. Id. at 2375. "There are circumstances," the Court said, "in which we will accord speech
by attorneys on public issues and matters of legal representation the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer. This case, however, concerns pure commercial advertising, for which we have
always reserved a lesser degree of protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 2381 (citations
omitted).

78. Id.at 2375-81. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 2381.
81. Id.at 2376.
82. Id. at 2377.
83. Id.The Florida Bar submitted 106 pages to the district court summarizing its two-year
study of lawyer advertising and solicitation. Id.
notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
84. See infra
85. Florida Bar, 115 S.Ct. at 2377.

86. Id. at 2378.
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Turning to the third prong, the Court examined the relationship
between the state's interests and the means used to advance those interests. The Court required a reasonable "fit" between the state's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends.' WFI argued that the regulation precluded a victim from receiving important information about legal
options, at a time when defense attorneys and insurance adjusters are not
prohibited from contacting that person.' In response to that argument, the
Court said those concerns are mitigated by limiting the ban to a brief thirty-day period during which potential personal injury clients may obtain
information about the availability of legal representation in many other
ways.9 The Court concluded that the regulation, narrow both in scope
and duration, survives the third part of the test.' °
The dissenting justices agreed with the majority that a three-part
inquiry derived from Central Hudson is appropriate in commercial speech
cases. 91 The dissent cautioned against oversimplification, however, noting
the complex nature of expression and the risk of suppressing vital information.9 It is "imperative" to apply the test with "exacting care and
fidelity to our precedents," the dissent said.93
First, the dissent addressed whether the state's asserted interests are
sufficiently substantial. The dissent found that the state's interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of the victim does not justify restrictions on speech.' Turning to the state's second interest, protecting the
dignity of the legal profession, the dissent viewed the result as censorship,
"pure and simple."'

The regulation also failed the second prong of the test, in the
dissent's opinion, because the state did not demonstrate that the dangers it
seeks to eliminate are real.96 The dissent found the Bar's 106-page sum-

87. Id. at 2380-81.
88. Id. at 2380.
89. Id. The Court specifically mentioned newspapers, radio, prime-time television, billboards,
and untargeted letters to the general public. Id.
90. Id. at 2381.
91. Id. at 2382.
92. Id.
93. ld.
94. Id. at 2382-83. The dissenting justices said the "substantial concern is that victims or their
families will be offended by receiving a solicitation during their grief and trauma. But we do not
allow restrictions on speech to be justified on the ground that the expression might offend the listener." Id. at 2383.
95. Id. at 2383. "There is no authority," said the dissent, "for the proposition that the Constitution permits the State to promote the public image of the legal profession by suppressing information about the profession's business aspects." Id. at 2386.
96. Id. at 2383-84.
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mary of its two-year study of lawyer advertising and solicitation to be
"self-serving and unsupported" and inadequate to demonstrate the existence of a real harm. 7 In addition, the dissent observed that the Court had
not cited to any material in the record to support the state's claim that the
regulation advances its interest in protecting victims' privacy .98
Moreover, the dissent decided that the relationship between the
state's ends and the means chosen to advance those ends was not a reasonable fit.' The restriction applies to "far more" speech than necessary,
the dissent observed."° Four justices found the majority opinion to be a
"serious departure" from precedent.''
ANALYSIS

For nearly twenty years, cases have built upon the foundation laid
by Bates." Now the Court has changed course. In Florida Bar, the
majority said it sought to bolster the dignity of the legal profession. To
this end, vital First Amendment guarantees for attorney speech have been
sacrificed.
The most troubling aspect of the Florida Bar decision is that, although the majority set forth the correct analysis,"' it did not apply that
analysis rigorously. Intermediate scrutiny is required by existing precedent,"° but the Court gave it only lip service. By abandoning the correct
analytical framework,"te the Court has established a separate standard for
solicitation by attorneys.'06

97. Id. at 2384. See infra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
98. Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384.
99. Id.

100. Id. In support of its position the dissent pointed out that the thirty-day ban applies to all
accidental injuries, no matter how serious; prompt legal representation is essential in many cases; and
other means of regulation have not been tried. Id.
101. Id. at 2386.

102. Id. at 2375. See supra notes 36-67 and accompanying text.
103. The consideration of attorneys' communications, like the ones in this case, as more than
mere commercial speech is beyond the scope of this casenote.
104. See, e.g., Rubin, infra notes 107-118 (applying intermediate scrutiny to strike down gov-

ernment restrictions on beer advertising).
105. Cf. LOUISE L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 63 (1993) (noting that non-advertising forms

of promotion by professionals receive less constitutional protection than other categories of commercial speech).

106. Compare Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (an accountant's direct, in-person
solicitation of accounting business may not be suppressed by the state) with Ohralik. 436 U.S. 447

(1978) (an attorney's direct, in-person solicitation of personal injury business may be suppressed by
the state). See also Moore v. Morales, 63 P.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1995) (remanding for consideration of
constitutionality of a thirty-day ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation by physicians, surgeons, other
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A. An irrational regulatory scheme does not materially advance the
state's asserted interest.
Two months prior to its Florida Bar decision, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the stringent requirements of Central Hudson.'0 7 The Rubin
opinion emphasized that the Central Hudson test applies equally to all
categories of commercial speech, even to commercial speech involving
vices such as alcohol consumption and gambling.' °8 Astonishingly, the
very same Court set aside this precedent and did not apply these criteria
to protect attorney speech.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas said in Rubin that an
irrational regulatory scheme cannot materially advance a government
interest." Rubin involved a federal statute that prohibited the disclosure
of alcohol content on beer labels. The Court concluded that the
government's failure to go a step further and prohibit such disclosure in
brewer's advertisements, "which would seem to constitute a more influential weapon" in any strength war, "makes no rational sense.""'
Similarly, because the Bar's rule falls only on plaintiff's lawyers, the
scheme is irrational. The state allows defendants, their attorneys, investigators, and insurance adjusters to contact unrepresented victims to gather
evidence or offer settlement, even in their homes, even if they are
vulnerable."' If the state's true aim is to protect the privacy of accident
victims, prohibiting contact by both defense lawyers and plaintiff's lawyers would seem to be more effective. The state's failure to do so makes
no rational sense. If the Florida Bar Court had adhered to the precedent
established two months earlier in Rubin, the restriction on attorney speech
would have been struck down.

licensed health care professionals, chiropractors and private investigators but upholding constitutionality of restriction on lawyers).
107.

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1995). See supra notes 68-72 and

accompanying text.
108.
109.
110.
1M1.
senting).

Rubin, 115 s. Ct. at 1589.
Id. at 1592.
Id.
Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2381-82 (Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dis-
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B.
The state did not meet its burden of showing that the asserted harm
is real.
Discounting anecdotal evidence, the Rubin Court held that the state
"must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real."' 12 Acknowledging
that precedent requires the state to carry this burden, the Florida Bar
Court inexplicably determined that the record was substantial enough to
confirm the harm." 3
Two months earlier, the Court had reasoned in Rubin that "mere
speculation and conjecture" do not satisfy the state's burden." 4 The Florida Bar Court, however, allowed the state to justify a restriction on attorney speech with nothing more than self-serving, unsupported data prepared by one of the adverse parties."' The Bar's 106-page, two-year
study included "no actual surveys, few indications of sample size or
selection procedures," and "no explanations of methodology . ..
1.6
Only thirty-four of those pages arguably discussed direct-mail solicitation.
Only two pages contained a synopsis of a study of the attitudes of Floridians towards direct-mail solicitation." 7 If the Florida Bar Court had followed established precedent, the Bar's evidence would not have been
sufficient to justify its rule.
Moreover, the Bar's claims are contradicted in a recent study by the
ABA Commission on Advertising. In March, 1995, the ABA Journal
reported that the legal profession's public image problems are not the
fault of lawyer advertising. "While the legal profession strongly believes
that advertising contributes to the decline of the profession's image,"
according to the report, "the public rarely mentions advertising as a factor." Instead, research shows that "those who dislike lawyers believe they
' 8
are dishonest, selfish and too expensive." 1

112. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592 (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993)).
113. See infra note 117.
114. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592.
115. FloridaBar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissenting). "The majority describes this anecdotal matter as 'noteworthy for its breadth and detail,' but
when examined it is noteworthy for its incompetence." Id.
116. Id.at 2384.
117. Id.
118. James Podgers, Sorting Out Image, Ads, Ethics, 81 A.B.A. J. 94 (1995).
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C. The state's interest in protecting the image of attorneys is not a substantial interest.
Traditionally, established segments of the legal profession have
condemned advertising and solicitation." 9 The debate becomes heated
when an attorney's conduct is labeled "ambulance chasing." Such solicitation often is met with outrage by members of the legal profession, the
media, and the public."0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Florida
Bar because the case presented the perfect vehicle for, in the words of the
dissenting justices, a "latent protectionism of the established bar."'.' The
five justices in the majority knew that the ruling would be more palatable
cloaked in a purported protection of vulnerable, personal injury victims.
The Court held that the Bar's interest in protecting the "flagging
reputations of Florida lawyers" was substantial, substantial enough to
satisfy the Central Hudson test and substantial enough to warrant
regulation of attorney speech.'" This determination, however, contradicts a previous ruling that a state's interest in protecting the image of
attorneys is, in fact, not a substantial interest. The Zauderer Court
held that attorney speech may not be suppressed merely because some
members of the bar find advertising and solicitation beneath their
dignity." The Florida Bar majority failed to acknowledge, let alone
distinguish, the Zauderer ruling.
By upholding the non-solicitation rules in this case, the Supreme
Court has perpetuated a historic bias. Today's non-solicitation rules copy
century-old rules promulgated by well established lawyers.' 24 With this

119. The roots of prohibitions against lawyer advertising lie in thirteenth century England where
rich, young men studied law, looking to a life of public service. Economic competition did not exist
at this level of society. Young American men educated in England brought back with them a bias
against practicing law as a trade. Katherine A. Laroe, Comment, Much Ado About Barratry: State
Regulation of Attorneys' Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1513, 1519-20
(1994). The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969, and the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which replaced the Model Code in 1983, reflected this anti-solicitation
stance. Id. at 1522. Currently, all states follow either the Model Code or the Model Rules in regulating targeted, direct-mail solicitation. Id. (listing each state's provisions regulating targeted direct-mail
solicitation by attorneys). An attorney who violates these ethics rules may be disciplined by the bar.
Id. at 1522-1523.
120. Modem ambulance chasers solicit accident and wrongful death clients in the aftermath of
airplane crashes, factory explosions, and school-bus accidents. Laroe, supra note 119, at 1514.
121. See Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2385 (Justices Kennedy, Stevens. Souter, and Ginsburg
dissenting).
122. FloridaBar, 115 S. Ct. at 2376 (citing Petitioner's Brief at 28, Florida Bar v. Went For
It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)).
123. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985).
124. See Louise L. Hill, A Lawyer's Pecuniary Gain: The Enigma of Impermissible Solicitation,
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decision, the Florida Bar Court has placed solo practitioners and small
law firms at a decided disadvantage.'25
D.

The asserted privacy interest does not justify suppressing attorney

speech.
The Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Shapero. 2 6 Disturbingly, the FloridaBar majority opinion obscured the Shapero holding
in order to circumvent its precedential value. In Shapero, the Court set
out the test for determining whether attorneys' solicitations will be accorded constitutional protection." 7 Working within the Central Hudson
parameters, courts are not to inquire whether there exist potential clients
who are vulnerable, but rather, "whether the mode of communication"
poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit a vulnerability. 2 The
Shapero Court found that targeted, direct-mail solicitation and other
modes of written communication do not pose a serious danger of such
exploitation. 129

5 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 393, 421 (1991)

(citing MONROE E. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING

LAWYERS' ETHics 250 (1990)). See supra note 119.
125. Id. In his concurring opinion in 01iralik, Justice Marshall said that non-solicitation rules
are "discriminatory with respect to the suppliers as well as the consumers of legal services. Just as the
persons who suffer most from lack of knowledge about lawyers' availability belong to the less privileged classes of society, so the disciplinary rules against solicitation fall most heavily on those attorneys engaged in a single-practitioner or small-partnership form of practice-attorneys who typically
earn less than their fellow practitioners in larger, corporate-oriented firms. Indeed, some scholars
have suggested that the rules against solicitation were developed by the professional bar to keep recently immigrated lawyers, who gravitated toward the smaller, personal injury practice, from effective
entry into the profession." 436 U.S. at 475-6 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
126. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). In fact, the appeals court in this case said that Shapero was controlling. MeHenry v. The Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (11th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub noam, Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2378 (1995). Furthermore, as recently as April 19, 1995,
in the commercial speech case that immediately preceded Florida Bar, the Court reaffirmed the Central Hudson test for scrutinizing restrictions on commercial speech. Rubin, Secretary of Treasury v.
Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591 (1995).
127. 486 U.S. at 472.
128. Id. at 474. The Court observed that a potential client "will feel equally 'overwhelmed' by
his legal troubles and will have the same 'impaired capacity for good judgment' regardless of whether
a lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a newspaper advertisement-concededly
constitutionally protected activities-or instead mails a targeted letter." Id. Comparing targeted, direct-mail to the in-person solicitation permissibly banned under Ohrolik, the Court added that targeted, direct-mail solicitation "poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence than does inperson solicitation." Written communication does not involve the "coercive force of the personal
presence of a trained advocate or the pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no
answer to the offer of representation." Id. at 475 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626. 642 (1985)).
129. 486 U.S. at 476. The Court said isolated abuses or mistakes occurring with targeted, direct-mail solicitations do not justify a categorical prohibition because the state can regulate through
less restrictive means. Requiring the attorney to file a letter with a state agency, requiring the letter to
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Yet, in Florida Bar the Court declined to adhere to its own rule. In
light of existing precedent, the relevant inquiry should have focused on
the mode of communication. Instead, the Court focused on a privacy
interest. 3 '
In its efforts to distinguish Shapero, the majority said that a different
privacy interest was at stake because a different kind of intrusion was
involved.' 3' The potential clients in that case were facing foreclosure and
their privacy was invaded when the lawyer learned the details of their
legal affairs, perhaps by reading the newspaper. In this case, the Court
said that the intrusion occurred at the moment the lawyer used information he had acquired, to send a letter to a vulnerable person traumatized
by recent injury. Unlike the privacy interest in Shapero, the majority
said, this privacy interest is inherent in the home, a place afforded great
protection.
This line of reasoning fails, however, because even if the majority does
see a different privacy interest, under Supreme Court precedent, this privacy
interest does not outweigh the First Amendment guarantees afforded commercial speech. Virtually all direct mail invades the tranquility of the recipient's
home, yet is protected by the First Amendment.' 32 Some victims may be
offended by an attorney's letter, but the Court has said that the "mere possibility" that some people may find advertising offensive cannot justify suppressing it. " Furthermore, even though potential personal injury or wrongful
death claimants may be suffering impaired judgment, a letter, especially one
labeled 'advertising' in red, poses little danger of overreaching or undue
influence.' 34 Direct-mail solicitation does not pose a serious danger of overreaching, even if the potential client is vulnerable.

be labeled as an advertisement, and other less restrictive regulations, while imposing some burden on
state agencies, are preferable because of the importance of the free flow of commercial information.
Id. at 476-78.
130. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
131.

Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115

. Ct. 2371, 2379 (1995). To support its holding,

the majority said that in Shapero the state did not use privacy interests to justify its regulation, and
that the treatment of privacy had been perfunctory and of little help in addressing restrictions on
targeted, direct mail in the immediate aftermath of accidents. Id. at 2379.
132.

McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1044.

133. The Court has applied this principle to advertising in general, holding that the First
Amendment protects the right to use the mail. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S.

60, 76 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,concurring). In Bolger, the Court found that shielding recipients from
mail they might find offensive furthered an interest of "little weight." Id. at 71.
134. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1042-43. The Shapero Court suggested that such labeling is a permissible state regulation. 486 U.S. at 477. That Court added that the state may regulate through
means far less restrictive and more precise than a total ban. The most obvious of which, the Court
observed, is to "require the lawyer to file any solicitation letter with a state agency, giving the state
ample opportunity to supervise mailings and penalize actual abuses." Id. at 476 (citations omitted).
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has effectively overruled Shapero.
Florida Bar involves a narrower prohibition than Shapero, forbidding directmail contact during the thirty days when a victim is most vulnerable following an accident, rather than totally banning such contact. Even so, a thirtyday ban will "effectively deprive" many accident victims of information
about available legal assistance "precisely when they need it most."135 During
the initial period following a serious accident, victims must face "an unintelligible legal tangle and demands to waive or compromise their rights. It is
during this time that informed decisionmaking is crucial." 136 By forbidding

direct-mail contact by plaintiff's lawyers during this critical period, the Court
has negated, in many instances, the value of such contact at a future time.
Wyoming and states with strong established bar associations may look
to the Florida Bar decision as support for a move back to the pre-Bates era
when all forms of lawyer advertising and solicitation were anathema. Rule
7.3 of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct is unconstitutional under
existing precedent. 37 Rule 7.3 regulates direct contact between a lawyer and
a potential client,' 38 placing a total ban on lawyers' targeted direct-mail solicitation of employment.' Indications are that the Wyoming State Bar Association, within the next year, will propose changes to Rule 7.3 in order to
bring the rule into line with the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Florida Bar."4
As long as the makeup of the United States Supreme Court remains
unchanged, the possibility exists that Bates could be overruled.' 4 ' Justice

135. Petition to Amend, supra note 4, at 474 (Shaw, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id.
137. The United States Supreme Court held, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, that the categorical prohibition of attorneys' direct-mail solicitation of potential clients violates attorneys' free speech
rights. 486 U.S. 466, 471 (1988). See generally John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Restrictions on
Attorneys' Advertisements Regarding Legal Services as Violating Federal Constitution'sFirst Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 110 L.Ed.2d 688 (1995).
138.

WYOMING RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS AT LAW Rule 7.3 (1994).

Rule 7.3 provides in pertinent part:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom
the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
Id.
139. Id. Rule 7.3 defines 'solicit' to include contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by
letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need
legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that
they might in general find such services useful. Id.
140. Telephone Interview with Kermit C. Brown, immediate past president of the Wyoming
State Bar Association (Oct. 12, 1995).
141. In a statement that may foreshadow the future of Bates, Justice O'Connor has said, "[Als
soon as one steps into the realm of prices for 'routine' legal services such as uncontested divorces and
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O'Connor has consistently opposed attorney advertising and solicitation. 42
Chief Justice Rehnquist has opposed constitutional protection for all forms of
commercial speech. Justice Scalia joined O'Connor and Rehnquist in Florida
Bar and in the Shapero dissent. Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer have now
indicated, in FloridaBar, their willingness to support restrictions on commercial speech as applied to attorneys.
CONCLUSION

In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
upheld a state regulation prohibiting lawyers' direct-mail solicitation of potential clients within thirty days of an accident. In reaching its decision, the
Court applied the three-part Central Hudson test. The Court's flexible application of parts one and two of the test and cursory consideration of part three
led to an incorrect result. Inconsistent applications of the test result in unconstitutional restrictions on free speech. The public deserves protection from
oppressive conduct, but attorneys' free speech rights should not be trampled
in the process. The challenge facing the Court was to balance these conflicting interests. Unconstitutional restrictions on lawyer solicitation are not the
solution. An exacting application of the Central Hudson test would have
suggested narrower limitations and rigorous enforcement of the ethics rules
that really matter.
The biggest loser is the consuming public. This case is about truthful,
non-misleading letters to persons who may need an attorney. The United
States Supreme Court seems willing to make society pay the price of keeping
people ignorant.
MARY R. EuKENBERRY

personal bankruptcies, however, it is quite clear to me that the States may ban such advertising completely. The contrary decision in Bates was in my view inconsistent with the standard test that is now
applied in commercial speech cases." Shapero, 486 U.S. 466, 485 (1988) (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist,
C.J. and Scalia, J. dissenting). She added, "[Ulnder the Central Hudson test government has more
than ample justification for banning or strictly regulating most forms of price advertising." Id. at 486.
142. Dissenting in Shapero, Justice O'Connor said that "fairly severe constraints on attorney
advertising can continue to play an important role in preserving the legal profession as a genuine
profession." 486 U.S. 466, 491 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined Justice
O'Connor in dissent. Id. at 480.
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